US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs
8-17-2022

The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative
Approach to the Joint Task Force
Eric Bissonette
Thomas Bruscino
Kelvin Mote
Matthew Powell
Marc Sanborn

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, and the
Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, Marc Sanborn, James Watts, and Louis
G. Yuengert, The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task
Force (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2022),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/953

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

Authors
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, Marc Sanborn, James Watts, and Louis
G. Yuengert

This book is available at USAWC Press: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/953

Collaborative studies

Military Innovation

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/decisive

The Future

Joint
OF the

Warfighting
Headquarters:

An Alternative Approach
to the Joint Task Force
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino,
Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell,
Marc Sanborn, James Watts,
and Louis Yuengert

US Army War College

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the
strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who
are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of
Landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act as a “think factory”
for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely
engage in discourse and debate on the role of ground forces in achieving national
security objectives.
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic
research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap
between military and academia.
The SSI Live Podcast Series provides access to SSI analyses and scholars on
issues related to national security and military strategy with an emphasis on
geostrategic analysis. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/ssi-live-archive

The Center for Strategic Leadership provides strategic education, ideas,
doctrine, and capabilities to the Army, the Joint Force, and the nation.
The Army, Joint Force, and national partners recognize the Center for
Strategic Leadership as a strategic laboratory that generates and cultivates
strategic thought, tests strategic theories, sustains strategic doctrine,
educates strategic leaders, and supports strategic decision making.
The School of Strategic Landpower provides support to the US Army
War College purpose, mission, vision, and the academic teaching
departments through the initiation, coordination, and management of
academic-related policy, plans, programs, and procedures, with emphasis
on curriculum development, execution, and evaluation; planning and
execution of independent and/or interdepartmental academic programs;
student and faculty development; and performance of academic-related
functions as may be directed by the Commandant.
The US Army Heritage and Education Center makes available
contemporary and historical materials related to strategic leadership,
the global application of Landpower, and US Army Heritage to inform
research, educate an international audience, and honor soldiers, past
and present.
The Army Strategic Education Program executes General Officer
professional military education for the entire population of Army General
Officers across the total force and provides assessments to keep senior
leaders informed and to support programmatic change through evidencebased decision making.

US Army War College

The Future of the
Joint Warfighting Headquarters:

An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell,
Marc Sanborn, James Watts, Louis Yuengert

August 2022

Strategic Studies Institute

i

US Army War College

This is a peer-reviewed publication. The views expressed in this publication are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
the Department of Defense, or the US government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not
disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official
US policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes
controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This publication is
cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

******

This publication is subject to Title 17 United States Code § 101 and 105. It is in the public domain
and may not be copyrighted by any entity other than the covered author.

******

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and should be forwarded to:
Director, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, US Army War College,
47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

******
ISBN 1-58487-841-X

Cover Photo Credits

Front Cover
Air Force
Description: Buckley Air Force Base, United States
Photo by: Senior Master Sergeant John Rohrer, Colorado National Guard
Photo Date: May 1, 2017
Photo ID: 3363832
VIRIN: 170501-Z-QD622-319
Website: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/3363832/air-force
US Navy, Royal Thai Navy participate in CARAT Exercise 2021
Description: Royal Thai Navy ship HTMS Naresuan (FFG 421) leads a battle line of warships during an exercise
for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Thailand 2021 with the amphibious transport dock ship
USS Green Bay (LPD 20). In its 27th year, the CARAT series is comprised of multinational exercises, designed to enhance
US and partner navies’ abilities to operate together in response to traditional and nontraditional maritime security challenges
in the Indo-Pacific region.
US Navy Photo by: Petty Officer 2nd Class Darcy McAtee, Command Destroyer Squadron 7, Gulf of Thailand
Photo Date: September 8, 2021
Photo ID: 6832200
VIRIN: 1210908-N-YP246-1120
Website: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6832200/us-navy-royal-thai-navy-participate-carat-exercise-2021

ii

US Army War College
2021 US Army Best Warrior Competition
Description: Sergeant First Class Brian Ringrose, a Special Forces engineer representing US Army Special Operations
Command, loads a fresh magazine during the stress shoot of the Army Best Warrior Competition held at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, Oct. 5, 2021. The best from the US Army compete annually for the title of Best Warrior. Representing seven
geographic commands and 22 functional commands, soldiers spend a week competing in a variety of challenges including
firing weapons, land navigation, the Army Combat Fitness Test, and various mystery events. These challenges will ultimately
test their capabilities and combat readiness.
Photo by: Staff Sergeant John Healey, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Photo Date: October 5, 2021
Photo ID: 6883366
VIRIN: 211005-A-PC120-1005
Website: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6883366/2021-us-army-best-warrior-competition
Exercise Baccarat - 2021
Description: US Marine Corps Second Lieutenant Dakota Smith, a native of Tampa, Florida, and a platoon commander
for 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division (2nd MARDIV), waits with a French Legionnaire during
Exercise Baccarat in Lozère, Occitanie, France, October 20, 2021. Exercise Baccarat is a three-week joint exercise between
2nd MARDIV and the French Foreign Legion that challenges forces with physical and tactical training and provides the
opportunity to exchange knowledge that assists in developing and strengthening bonds.
US Marine Corps Photo by: Lance Corporal Jennifer E. Reyes, US Marine Force Corp Forces, Europe and Africa,
Lozère, 1, France
Photo Date: October 20, 2021
Photo ID: 6909280
VIRIN: 211020-M-PK533-1642
Website: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6909280/exercise-baccarat-2021
Back Cover
Joint Task Force Liberia Harrier
Description: A US Marine Corp AV-8B Harrier aircraft, deployed with the 398th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG), takes
off at Freetown International Airport, Sierra Leone. The 398th AEG is currently in Sierra Leone to provide personnel
recovery and emergency evacuation capability for the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams (HAST) and the Fleet
Anti-terrorism Security Teams (FAST) in Liberia, during Joint Task Force (JTF) Liberia.
Official Department of Defense Photo by: First Sergeant Justin D. Pyle, Communications Directorate, Freetown,
Sierra Leone
Photo Date: August 14, 2003
Photo ID: 869612
VIRIN: 030814-F-FZ209-006
Website: https://www.dvidshub.net/image/869612/joint-task-force-liberia-harrier

iii

US Army War College

Foreword
Coming out of the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States military began
to turn its attention to great-power competition with near-peer adversaries. Given the broad
and diverse challenges presented by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist
organizations, the United States has adopted as broad an approach as possible across the
competition continuum. America’s long record of military intervention, coupled with real
Chinese military threats in the South China Sea and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,
suggests the United States military must be prepared for armed conflict.
In 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed professional military education institutions,
especially war colleges, to focus more intently on the problems of Joint warfighting. Written by
a team of civilian and military faculty and students from the US Army War College Carlisle
Scholars Program and across the Joint Force, this collaborative study took the Joint Chiefs of
Staff’s direction to heart. What began as a classroom study of the makeup of Joint Task Forces, the
effectiveness of the Joint Planning Process, and service and Joint warfighting concepts grew into
full-blown recommendations for reform. The team concluded the current systems, which
rely on overworked combatant commands and ad hoc Joint Task Forces that are headed
by quickly repurposed service headquarters, are not ideal for the challenges of rapidly
developing Joint warfare in the twenty-first century.
Relying on a wide variety of American historical examples and recent experiences, we recommend
the creation of a new type of permanent Joint warfighting command and headquarters called
an “American Expeditionary Force.”

Thomas Bruscino
Department of Military Strategy, Planning,
and Operations, US Army War College
Louis G. Yuengert
Department of Command, Leadership,
and Management, US Army War College
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Executive Summary
How will the United States military maintain a competitive advantage in future wars?
As its adversaries are developing the capabilities to fight and win more rapidly, the US military
must become a superior and sustainable Joint Force sooner than its adversaries and move
toward establishing standing expeditionary headquarters as its primary warfighting
headquarters instead of Joint Task Forces (JTFs). The US military should formalize the
American Expeditionary Force as the principal Joint warfighting headquarters to respond to crises
requiring military intervention. Successful implementation would require these headquarters
to align with the nature of Joint warfighting, take advantage of the strengths of the
services, minimize additional force structure requirements, and aid current Joint and service
concept development.
Existing combatant commands have not been optimal Joint warfighting headquarters because
they devote most of their time to military diplomacy, theater security cooperation, and support
to great power competition. Current reliance on Joint Task Forces to fill the gap is problematic
because the postcrisis activation of such formations requires significant formation time, and Joint
Task Force headquarters are primarily drawn from single-service headquarters that lack the
experience and training necessary to conduct complex, Joint operations.
The US military should establish American Expeditionary Forces as the principle Joint
warfighting headquarters. These headquarters should be standing; numbered; regionally aligned
with geographic combatant commands; and drawn from existing, regionally aligned service
headquarters and formations. The proposed American Expeditionary Forces would function with
American Expeditionary Force component commanders in Joint command decision making in
a command council with the American Expeditionary Force commander; be organized with
a functional staff, rather than by J-codes; and use a Joint warfighting operations process whereby
the command council and their functional staff develop the Joint operational approach and component
command staffs engage in detailed planning and orders production.
A principal benefit of the American Expeditionary Force concept beyond Joint warfighting
in a contingency is the ability to align and experiment with both service and Joint operational
concepts to enable force management. Standing American Expeditionary Forces are
ideally suited to experiment with, evaluate, and develop Joint warfighting concepts and
service-specific concepts and integrate the space and cyber domains in Joint warfighting. As
regionally aligned, continuously established, Joint formations, the American Expeditionary
Forces could most effectively test these concepts against the doctrine and capabilities of
potential adversaries.
In the future, the US military’s ability to respond to its adversaries’ actions quickly,
effectively, and Jointly will be a strategic deterrent. Although establishing standing
warfighting headquarters that are modeled after the current Joint task force organization
would help address some of the efficiency and effectiveness inadequacies of the current
approach, this solution is not a complete one. In addition, receiving service buy-in, aligning
vii
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with current Joint concept development initiatives, or undergoing successful implementation
without adding additional force structure would be unlikely. Therefore, the US military should
formalize the American Expeditionary Force as the principle Joint warfighting headquarters
to respond to crises requiring military intervention.
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Introduction
In great-power competition, geographic combatant commands play a critical role in
developing strategic partnerships within their areas of responsibility and developing and
executing campaign plans in support of a whole-of-government approach. Geographic
combatant commanders are responsible for military operations in their respective
regions during peacetime and war.1 Although essential, the combatant command’s
global competition role is distinctively different from its Joint warfighting role. In times
of crisis, current practice relies on establishing a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters
to execute military operations and solve complex national security problems. The
use of the Joint Task Force allows combatant commanders to delegate command
and control of contingency operations while focusing on day-to-day competition
within their regions. Once fully operational, the JTF headquarters can leverage
the expertise inherent within the assembled command to maximize the synergy
of the Joint Force’s capabilities.
Reliance on Joint Task Forces is complicated because the application of US military
power is expeditionary while simultaneously requiring a prompt response. Given the
geographic position of the United States, the Joint Force is not likely to engage another
great power on American soil. Furthermore, quick land grabs have increasingly become
the strategy of choice for coercive interstate territorial transactions, requiring the
US military to have the capability to respond quickly to adversarial actions that
threaten national interests.2 Therefore, the American military’s ability to project
military power rapidly into a contested theater and sustain the power as a coherent
Joint Force represents a significant competitive advantage in great-power competition.
To ensure an enduring competitive advantage, the Joint Force must minimize
the time required to begin Joint operations. Although the model of post-crisis
JTF formation is effective, its ad hoc constitution introduces several systematic
inefficiencies. These inefficiencies translate to lost time, increasing the risk of
degradation in military effectiveness. 3 At present, the US military maintains
technological and doctrinal advantages over adversaries, masking the risk incurred
with the ad hoc construction of a Joint warfighting headquarters. As adversaries
close these gaps, the US military must reduce Joint warfighting inefficiencies. In short,
the American military can do better in maintaining its competitive edge.
1. Kathleen J. McInnis, Defense Primer: Commanding US Military Operations, IF10542 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, updated November 8, 2021).

2. Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries,” International Studies
Quarterly 61, no. 4 (December 2017): 490–522.

3. Timothy M. Bonds, Myron Hura, and Thomas Young, Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 1.
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The Joint Force can capitalize on the ongoing modernization efforts of the
individual services and move toward establishing standing Joint Force expeditionary
headquarters to execute Joint warfighting in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.
These headquarters would realize the full potential of design thinking by providing
the organizational structure to develop, debate, and experiment with service
and Joint concepts, playing to the strengths of both the services and the Joint Force.
Moreover, establishing enduring headquarters elements aligned against an identified
threat would provide a concrete basis for planning—and thus improve—the robustness
of contingency plans. Finally, once a headquarters has been established, commanders
and their staff officers could experiment with innovative headquarters design concepts
that foster critical command-staff relationships among the officers’ respective service
force providers and other US governmental and international agencies. Formalizing
an enduring organizational structure is the first step in optimizing the implementation
of other ongoing, service-led initiatives designed to increase jointness.
Calls for standing Joint Force headquarters are not new. The demonstrated
military effectiveness of the JTF model, coupled with increasing service-specific
resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints, has resulted in little evolution
in Joint Force headquarters construction since the end of World War II.4 The
zero-sum federal budgeting processes force the services to compete for resources.
Because of their influence on the defense budget and their important domainspecific demands, internal concept development and programs take precedent over
Joint Force requirements, especially as those requirements relate to Joint expeditionary
warfighting. Therefore, relying on an “economy of force” warfighting headquarters
so services can reallocate resources elsewhere is appealing.5
This collaborative study describes the challenges associated with current
approaches to Joint warfighting, including the use of the combatant command as a
warfighting headquarters and the insufficiency of the Joint Task Force in responding
to a crisis. Analysis of the Joint Task Force includes response time, manning, and
training and readiness issues. Additionally, the study discusses the challenges of
Joint warfighting, including the critical differences between single-service and
Joint warfighting and the unique aspects of Joint command and control.
Subsequently, the authors propose an alternative, standing Joint warfighting
4. Charles Krulak, “Commandant’s Planning Guidance,” Marine Corps Gazette 79, no 8. (August 1995): A-5; Department
of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), 33–34;
Craig A. Barkley, The Standing Joint Force Headquarters: A Planning Multiplier? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, 2006), 1; Mark D. Mandeles, “Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters,” JCOA Journal
(Summer 2010): 21–32; Chris Dougherty, More Than Half the Battle: Information and Command in a New American Way of War
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, May 2021), 2; and Bradley Lynn Coleman and Timothy A. Schultz,
“The Cornerstone of Joint Force Transformation: The Standing Joint Force Headquarters at US Southern Command, 2001–2011,”
Journal of Military History 85 (October 2021): 1029–68.

5. Michael G. Kamas, David W. Pope, and Ryan N. Propst, “Exploring a New System of Command and Control:
The Case for US Africa Command,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017): 83.
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headquarters, provisionally called the American Expeditionary Force (AEF),
that has been developed within the constraints described in the preceding
paragraphs. Discussion of the American Expeditionary Force includes a potential
organizational construct, the roles of critical elements in the Joint operations
process, and how the organizational framework could be applied within
select combatant commands. Finally, the study discusses the implications of
having standing headquarters that can analyze and experiment with current service
and Joint operational concepts to be best postured for future conflict.

3
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Challenges with Current Joint Warfighting Approaches
The Combatant Command as a Joint Warfighting Headquarters
Since the end of World War II, the United States has executed command and
control of its military forces through the Unified Command Plan, which integrates
the 11 unified combatant commands.6 The Department of Defense can use the
combatant command headquarters as a Joint warfighting headquarters, but empirical
historical analysis suggests maintaining unity of command, a tenet critical to effective
Joint warfighting, suffers under this organizational structure.7 In the Korean War,
the first test of the Unified Command Plan, the command was hardly Joint, despite
having US Army, Navy, and Air Force component commands. In addition to being
the Far East commander, General Douglas MacArthur retained command of all Army
forces in Korea, though he was charged with the primary responsibility of defending
Japan.8 Furthermore, the Far East Command staff “was essentially an Army Staff,
except for a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), which had Air
Force and Navy representation.”9 Finally, the formation of United Nations Command
(which MacArthur commanded) was also supported by Far East Command, further
confusing command relationships. Conversely, the US military experience in Vietnam
demonstrated a different approach to ensuring unity of command.
During the Vietnam War, the combatant commander delegated command authority
to a subordinate unified command. Command of US forces in Vietnam was initially
split between United States Pacific Command and Strategic Air Command, with
United States Pacific Command delegating responsibility to the commander, United
States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; commander in chief, Pacific Air
Forces; and commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.10 Because of the complexity involved in
coordinating these commands, United States Pacific Command eventually established
commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam as a subordinate
unified command with naval and air component commanders. Commander,
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam had responsibility
for a Joint operational area that included South Vietnam and the surrounding
6. Edward J. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–2012 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2013), 1; David Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified
Command (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010); and Thomas A. Cardwell III, Command Structure for Theater Warfare:
The Quest for Unity of Command (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1984).
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: JCS,
updated July 12, 2017), V-1.
8.

Drea et al., Unified Command Plan, 15–16.

9. Drea et al., Unified Command Plan, 16.

10. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 25; and Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of
Escalation, 1962–1967 (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2006), 35–69.
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coastal waters. Anything outside the established Joint operational area required
coordination with United States Pacific Command and its corresponding components.11
In other words, the US military did not rely on the combatant command as the
warfighting headquarters in Vietnam and would not do so again until the Gulf War,
during which the command structure was again complex and confusing. (For detail,
see “Command and Control in the 1991 Gulf War,” below.)
Recent history has also shown the use of combatant commands as warfighting
headquarters continues to muddle unity of command. A recent study of the Afghanistan
and Iraq wars notes the principle of unity of command “seems to have been bypassed in
the development of disjointed command and control structures.”12 Defense Secretary
Robert Gates observed as late as 2007 that the command structure in Afghanistan was
a “jerry-rigged arrangement [that] violated every principle of the unity of command.”13
In sum, the complexity of the geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility,
combined with the complexity of Joint warfighting, renders the development of effective
command-and-control structures extremely difficult for combatant commanders.

11.

Drea et al., Unified Command Plan, 26.

13.

Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 206.

12. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, “Introduction,” in Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War,
ed. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 10.
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Afghanistan and Iraq:
Requirement for Subordinate Warfighting Headquarters
Following al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan,
United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the geographic combatant command responsible
for the area, was committed to planning for and conducting operations in Afghanistan in October
and November 2001. The CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, committed
US Army Central (also known as Third US Army) as the ground component headquarters to
oversee combat operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, United States Central Command
maintained overall command and control of the intervention in Afghanistan. To achieve unity
of command, Franks reorganized the service components into functional commands: Coalition
Forces Air Component Command, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, etc. As
a result, Franks combined “all of the ground forces—US Army, US Marines, and Coalition
ground forces—into a single command under a single commander.”14 Third US Army, once US
Army Central and now Coalition Forces Land Component Command, assumed responsibility
for all ground forces and became fully committed to the war in Afghanistan. Joint integration
and synchronization, however, remained at the CENTCOM level.
In late November 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pressed United States Central
Command for an u pdated plan for a regime change in Iraq. As planning progressed, Lieutenant
General Paul Mikolashek, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command commander, was
responsible for overseeing the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and for planning, preparing,
and executing the invasion of Iraq as the “tactical headquarters.”15 In late summer 2002, Franks
relieved Mikolashek because he was “too cautious to oversee an aggressive invasion campaign.”16
In addition, more tellingly, Franks agreed to activate “a separate combined Joint Task Force for
Afghanistan . . . so that CFLCC could focus entirely on Iraq for the time being.”17

Clearly, United States Central Command could not effectively manage two disparate
contingencies. As the Iraq War progressed beyond the initial invasion, United States Central
Command transitioned command and control of operations in Iraq by giving Coalition Forces
Land Component Command the additional role of Combined Joint Task Force – Iraq before
later transitioning responsibility to the Army’s V Corps, which would become Combined Joint
Task Force - 7. Although these headquarters were called combined Joint Task Forces, they
consisted of Army and Marine forces, but not air or maritime forces.18 This transition allowed
Coalition Forces Land Component Command and United States Central Command to resume
a broader theater perspective.19 Recent experiences continue to highlight the importance of a
Joint warfighting headquarters below the level of the geographic combatant command.

14. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., The US Army in the Iraq War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College Press, 2019), 1:33.
15.

Rayburn and Sobchack, Iraq War, 55.

16. Rayburn and Sobchack, Iraq War, 55.
17. Rayburn and Sobchack, Iraq War, 56.

18. Rayburn and Sobchack, Iraq War, 135–36.
19. Rayburn and Sobchack, Iraq War, 136–38.
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Beyond geographic and Joint warfighting complexity, the role of the combatant
command continues to expand. Currently, geographic combatant commanders and
their staffs are instrumental in developing strategic partnerships in their areas of
responsibility, developing and executing commanders’ campaign plans, and preparing
their respective theater sustainment infrastructure in the event of a crisis. Should a
crisis emerge, the geographic combatant commands play a critical role in managing
regional partners and allies and maintaining a broad perspective of the conflict or
crisis, none of which is easily accomplished if the command is myopically focused on
the crisis itself. While all these activities are important, they differ distinctively from
Joint warfighting.
The historical record highlights the challenges associated with relying on the
combatant command to serve as a warfighting headquarters, particularly when
the command is managing multiple crises in disparate regions within an area of
responsibility. Recognizing the competing priorities associated with a return to greatpower competition, demonstrated challenges in maintaining unity of command during
complex combat operations, and the responsibilities associated with sustaining a theater,
the US military primarily relies on a JTF headquarters model when responding to
crises. This model assigns the mission and the responsibility to a single commander
and frees the combatant commander, staff, and service-component commands to
maintain a theater-level military diplomacy perspective.20

Insufficiency of the Joint Task Force
While a Joint Task Force offers the strategic flexibility of tailored force packages,
these organizations—particularly at the headquarters level—suffer from significant
inefficiency during large contingency operations. The ad hoc construction of the
JTF headquarters results in the juxtaposition of multiple talented, service-specific
professionals, all experts in their service’s capabilities and organizational culture. But
because the group has not trained together, it cannot reap the collective benefits that
emerge in highly cohesive teams.21 In this sense, the JTF headquarters is like a pickup
team of five elite professional basketball players from different teams. If matched
against a college team, the professional athletes, despite miscommunication and a
lack of cohesiveness, will likely prevail. Pitting the players against an equally capable
professional team, however, will likely cause them to lose.
20. Hearing to Receive Testimony on 30 Years of Goldwater-Nichols Reform, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of John J. Hamre, president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies); and George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, JTF Operations Since 1983, CRM 94-42 (Alexandria, VA:
Center for Naval Analyses, July 1994).
21.

Richard A Lacquement Jr., “Welding the Joint Seams,” Proceedings 128, no. 10 (October 2002): 82–85.
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The current process of establishing a JTF headquarters results in an initial crisis
response time that is too slow. Further delays in fully manning the headquarters
reduce the effectiveness of Joint operational planning and execution. To mitigate
this risk, the Department of Defense temporarily designates one of the service
component commands to serve as the base headquarters element. Athough
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command is available to augment this nascent
headquarters, this intervention is insufficient. The designated service component
command headquarters must continue to execute its daily theater responsibilities while
building a Joint Task Force and planning future combat operations. Additionally,
inefficiencies in manning and an ability for Joint collective training contribute to an
accumulating risk to military effectiveness.

9
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Crisis Response Time
Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve Response Time
The following excerpts from an after-action review of the Combined Joint Task Force –
Operation Inherent Resolve formation and transition highlight the significant response time
that results from using “JTF-capable” and designated service headquarters as Joint Task Forces.
“In June 2014, the situation in Iraq reached a level of crisis and the United States
Central Command (USCENTCOM) was directed to commence military operations
against Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL). The
USCENTCOM commander designated the Army component, the United States
Army Central Command (ARCENT), as a joint force land component command
( JFLCC) for operations in Iraq.”22
“USCENTCOM designated CJFLCC-I as Combined Joint Task Force-Operation
Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), eventually becoming a combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) in mid-October [2014]. The joint manning document ( JMD)
was created to sustain a CJTF while continuing theater army responsibilities
for a command that was also designated as a combined joint forces land
component command (CJFLCC) by USCENTCOM for operations in the joint
operations area. The time frame from submission of the JMD
until boots on the ground was anticipated at 120 days from the Secretary of Defense’s
approval.”23
“From the start of USCENTCOM’s operations against Daesh, to the deployment
of U.S. Army III Corps as the CJTF, 15 months had passed. In this time, ARCENT
was designated as a CJFLCC, and then later also served as the ARFOR and
ultimately CJTF-OIR.”24

As the adversaries of the United States close the technological capability gap, the
US military will rely more on the rapid projection of ready, Joint military forces to
achieve competitive overmatch. Inherently, forming a Joint Task Force leads to an
inefficient response, requiring the newly designated commander and staff to conduct
the following complex tasks simultaneously: crisis response planning; headquarters
formation; Joint, interagency, and coalition coordination; and subordinate force
22. US Army Combined Arms Center and Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), ARCENT Transition to Combined
Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve: Lessons and Best Practice, Initial Impressions Report no. 16-10 (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: CALL, March 2016), 1.
23.

24.

US Army Combined Arms Center and CALL, ARCENT Transition, 1.

US Army Combined Arms Center and CALL, ARCENT Transition, 2 (emphasis added).
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preparation.25 Accomplishing these tasks incurs a considerable time cost, compressing
the planning and preparation time for weeks to months after JTF activation.26 Seventy
percent of Joint Task Force headquarters have less than 35 days from initial notice
to operational employment.27 As the pace of great-power competition accelerates, a
future contingency will likely provide even less lead time, considering the increased
use of rapid land grabs as an adversary’s strategy of choice.
To mitigate initial JTF activation risks and fill the gap, the US military has come
to rely on “JTF-capable” headquarters. These headquarters are frequently service
component commands in the combatant command. However, these headquarters are
often ineffective because of manning, training, and readiness gaps. Figure 1 shows
the gap between the ideal JTF-capable headquarters and the historical trend.28 This
comparison is not a criticism; instead, it highlights that because the service-specific
command is filling dual roles, managing these roles in great-power competition in their
theater while preparing to serve as a Joint warfighting headquarters is difficult. The
need to transition responsibility from the JTF-capable headquarters to a designated
Joint Task Force only complicates the Joint Force’s response. A standing headquarters
focused solely on warfighting and crisis response would minimize the manning,
training, and readiness gaps in the current paradigm.

25. Deployable Training Division, Forming a JTF HQ (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, September 2015), 3.
26.
27.

Bonds, Hura, and Young, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 1.

Bonds, Hura, and Young, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Task Force, 1.

28. Deployable Training Division, Forming a JTF HQ, 10.
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Figure 1. JTF-capable headquarters’ historic readiness

Giving commands dual roles and collocating them constitute an additional readiness
concern. Although giving commands dual roles or collocating them accelerates
JTF activation, improves communication flow, and receives praise as a result, this
consolidation comes at a cost. For example, in the case of Joint Task Force Odyssey
Dawn, the Joint Task Force and Joint Force maritime component commander were
collocated onboard the USS Mount Whitney. This arrangement led to key leaders
playing dual roles. The N2 Navy intelligence officer was also the J2 Joint officer,
the N5 Navy plans officer was also the J5 Joint officer, and the Navy surgeon became
the Joint surgeon, etc.29 Many on the staff reported they were “burned out,” raising
questions about the long-term sustainability of such an arrangement. Giving command
teams dual roles also reduces the availability of forces to respond to another contingency.
If other contingencies arise, forming another Joint Task Force would be problematic,
and the dual-hatted command teams would struggle to respond with available forces
and the appropriate bandwidth.

29. Joe Quartararo Sr., Michael Rovenolt, and Randy White, “Libya’s Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control,”
PRISM 3, no. 2 (March 2012): 149.
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Joint Task Force Haiti: A Case for Standing Joint Task Forces
Lessons learned from the US response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake exemplify the
benefits of a standing Joint headquarters. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake
in Haiti destroyed vast areas of the nation’s capital, killing as many as 300,000 people and
leading to one of the largest deployments of US forces for disaster relief in US history. Mass
and initiative enabled a prompt, robust response. Critical to this response was United States
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) maintaining a Standing Joint Force Headquarters
that had forces stationed in proximity to Haiti (though the standing force was not manned
to full strength). Lieutenant General Ken Keen, commander of the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters, quickly determined initial requirements and communicated a broad operational
approach that resulted in resources being assigned to the relief effort quickly and ahead of
formal processes before Operation Unified Response officially began on January 14, 2010.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters’response during the Haitian earthquake demonstrated
that these standing formations provide the foundation for the collaboration required in Joint,
interagency, and multinational operations before a crisis occurs. Keen’s recommendations and
observations emphasize the value realized when existing Joint headquarters elements support
disaster relief operations.30 Such elements can help develop doctrine; facilitate planning,
training, and exercises with interagency partners; monitor the readiness of specialized units;
and maintain historical knowledge of unit operations.
Although not representative of a Joint warfighting scenario, the experiences of Joint Task
Force Haiti demonstrate the efficiency the US military can gain through standing Joint
formations focused on crisis response within a combatant command’s area of responsibility.31

Manning
Regardless of the mission, a JTF headquarters’ primary asset is people.
A diverse mix of properly trained personnel is vital in the early stages of the
operations cycle. Rapidly manning the Joint Task Force provides a competitive
advantage. But this advantage is rarely realized, partly because JTF headquarters
often lack staff in important specialties when the headquarters begins operations.
Obtaining all personnel required to carry out planning, intelligence, logistics,
communications, and the primary command and control necessary for operations
can take a JTF headquarters up to six months. In practice, the mission-specific
capabilities gained from low-density, highly specialized military professionals are
rarely present when operations begin. This process is lengthy because leaders must
30. P. K. (Ken) Keen et al., “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations,” Military Review 90,
no. 6 (November–December 2010): 85–96.

31. Gary Cecchine et al., The US Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013).
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first design the JTF headquarters, develop a Joint manning document, obtain
the combatant commander’s approval of this document, and have the Joint Staff
J1 validate the document to reach the desired manpower level.32
Manning Issues in Joint Task Force Liberia
In 2003, Liberia was in its 23rd year of civil war, and short but violent engagements between
rebel and government forces marked the first half of the year. The security situation in the
capital city of Monrovia collapsed, forcing the UN and other humanitarian organizations to
leave the country just as thousands of frightened civilians migrated toward the capital to secure
food and safety.33 As the situation continued to deteriorate in March, United States European
Command (EUCOM) began posturing forces in the region to prepare for future operations. On
July 17, the command sent the US Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne) warning
orders to establish a Joint Task Force by July 25.
The mission objective of Joint Task Force Liberia was to provide the necessary support for a
regional entity, the Economic Community of West African States, to mitigate the humanitarian
crisis in the vicinity of Monrovia. The US mission in Liberia succeeded, but this encouraging
outcome required overcoming significant manning inefficiencies through the fortuitous arrival
of training personnel. The supporting mission for US forces meant a smaller footprint than
may have been required for more direct US involvement, yet manning was still one of the
most challenging aspects of forming the Joint Task Force. The Southern European Task
Force experienced delays in filling the EUCOM-approved Joint manning document billets,
negatively affecting the initial planning effort. As mission analysis, which occurred early in
the planning process, was noted as the most important phase, the effect of the manning delays
was exacerbated. The Southern European Task Force was training arriving staff personnel at
the same time the JTF establishment warning order was issued.Part of this training was led
by personnel from the Army’s BattleCommand Training Program from Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; these trainers helped in the initial augmentation of the JTF staff.34

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, now a part of United States Transportation
Command, was established partially to address these sorts of manning issues. (In
2008, United States Joint Forces Command approved the establishment of Joint
Enabling Capabilities Command. In 2011, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command was
reassigned to United States Transportation Command due to United States Joint Forces

32.

Bonds, Hura, and Young, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Task Force, 1.

34.

Blair A. Ross Jr., “The US Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” Military Review 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 60–67.

33. Delphine Marie, “Tens of Thousands Displaced by Fighting near Monrovia,” Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (website), June 6, 2003, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/6/3ee0a6a57/tens-thousands-displaced-fighting
-near-monrovia.html.
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Command’s disestablishment.)35 Through its Joint Planning Support Element and Joint
Communications Support Element, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command “provides
planners, public affairs specialists, and communications capabilities to Combatant
Commanders to enable the rapid establishment of a Joint Force Headquarters or in
support of other missions, exercises, or planning efforts.”36 Joint Enabling Capabilities
Command provides tremendous value in this arena, but the command has limited
resources. Planners and communicators from the command are overextended and
underresourced as current humanitarian crises, which are not likely to abate soon,
monopolize command manpower.37 Additionally, supporting a contingency that
required a tailored capabilities package to counter a threat across multiple domains
would be difficult for the command. Even if the command could rapidly respond to
such a contingency, their ability to respond to multiple contingencies simultaneously
is limited—especially if the command was required to engage in fast-paced, intensive
operations against great-power competitors.
Collective Training
The readiness and availability of JTF forces are also suboptimal under the current
construct.38 Establishing a Joint Task Force during a time of crisis requires the
primarily single-service staff to learn and develop these foundational Joint elements
while executing the mission. The roles, responsibilities, processes, and commandand-control relationships of a Joint headquarters differ significantly from those of a
single-service headquarters. Many single-service headquarters have little experience
coordinating and executing different command relationships for other service units.
For instance, in the case of Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, the staff’s doctrinal
understanding of operational control, tactical control, and direct support was lacking.39
The need for the Joint Task Force to coordinate across both United States Africa
Command and European Command combatant commands compounded this problem.
The lack of understanding and coordination in situ introduces inefficiencies and wastes
time. Previous Joint Task Forces succeeded in their missions despite these handicaps
because services efficiently carried out their various functions, and all involved provided
herculean efforts to get the job done. These efforts may not be enough in future crises
in which the pace of operations exceeds that of previous JTF missions. Training as
a Joint Task Force before the crisis also allows for the inclusion of more capabilities
in readiness preparation.
35. “JECC History,” Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (website), accessed on May 26, 2021, https://www.jecc.mil
/Command-History/.
36. “Mission Capabilities,” Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (website), accessed on June 25, 2022,
https://www.jecc.mil/About-the-JECC/Mission-Capabilities/.
37.

Michael Hutchens, “The Joint Planning Support Element and JTF Formation” (briefing, Carlisle, PA, May 7, 2021).

39.

Quartararo, Rovenolt, and White, “Odyssey Dawn,” 147.

38. Lacquement, “Welding,” 82–85.
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Challenges of Joint Warfighting
Joint versus Service Warfighting
The history of Joint warfighting continuously reinforces one undeniable tenet:
Command in Joint warfare is qualifiably different from command within the different
services. The individual services are specialized because of the unique attributes
of their primary physical domains. The services follow their theories, doctrine,
and processes—all of which take a career in the given service to master. The
working structure of American Joint warfighting commands implicitly recognizes
this reality. Air Force, Navy or Marine, and Army commanders lead the so-called
“Joint” air, maritime, and land commands. For example, the Joint Force land
component commander, maritime component commander, and air component
commander represent service headquarters in actuality and are Joint in name
only. Indeed, the headquarters do not have Joint staffs; rather, they operate with
their respective G, N, and A staffs.
The lesson—not a critique but an observation—is that no individual, not
even the most well trained, well educated, and experienced, is prepared for all
considerations the command of a truly Joint force comprises. For instance, it is
hard to imagine an Army officer proficient in directly commanding a Navy fleet,
Air Force wing, or Marine Expeditionary Force, just as picturing an Air Force or
Navy officer in direct command of an Army corps or division would be difficult.
(General John Lejeune of the US Marine Corps commanded an Army division in
World War I, but he did so under special circumstances. Lejeune was a graduate of
the US Army War College, and his 2nd Division was made up of an Army brigade
and a Marine brigade.)40
Further, in doctrine and much recent practice, the United States military has relied
on a Joint staff organized in the J1 through J8 structure, built up with various centers,
cells, working groups, etc., to help the new Joint warfighting commander fill the gap.
This approach leads to two problems. First, staff members have no better grasp of the
intricacies and interactions of all parts of the Joint Force than the commander. Indeed,
in practice, the core of a newly created JTF staff comes from whatever service-specific
headquarters that becomes the JTF staff. For example, if an Army commander is
designated as the JTF commander, his or her G staff becomes a J staff overnight.
Although this J staff is supplemented by representatives from the other services and
enablers, the staff is still dominated by officers with an Army perspective.
40.

Merrill L. Bartlett, Lejeune: A Marine’s Life (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2012).
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The second problem extends beyond personnel limitations to the doctrinal structure
and processes of Joint warfighting headquarters. Historically, the Joint staff structure
(J1 through J8) and processes (the Joint Planning Process) developed most directly from
the Army’s field G staff and the Military Decision-Making Process.41 While the other
services have adopted superficially similar structures in their N and A staffs, these
commands and staffs plan and issue guidance to their fighting forces in significantly
different ways. A fleet does not fight like a division, a wing, or even a Marine
Air-Ground Task Force, and vice versa. Trying to make these service-specific
formations the same would be foolish.

41. Kelvin Crow and Joe R. Bailey, eds., Essential to Success: Historical Case Studies in the Art of Command at Echelons above
Brigade (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2017).
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Joint Warfighting and Unique Service Approaches
The experiences and operations of the Air Force in Joint commands illustrate the nuances of
unique service approaches. Contrary to popular belief, the air commander in Joint Task Forces is
rarely the Joint Force Air Component Commander and holds a position as either the Joint Air
Component Coordination Element or, as in recent instances, the Air Expeditionary Task Force
commander.42 Either way, and in keeping with airpower theory and doctrine, the Joint Force
Air Component Commander role remains at the wider theater level. The specifics of the exact
command relationship depend on the circumstances.43 Air operations are not run through a process
like the Joint Planning Process ( JPP); instead, air operations are run through the air tasking order.
In the Persian Gulf War, General Charles Horner used the air tasking order to maintain a nearly
service-specific level of control of air fires, partly because this characteristic of air operations
was opaque to commanders and staff from other services, even in Joint commands.44

Similarly, General Dwight Eisenhower, in an exception to the rest of his straightforward
command relationships in his Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF),
dealt with specific matters concerning airpower.The US Strategic Air Forces refused to take orders
from Eisenhower’s subordinate air commander based “upon the conviction that a Tactical Air
Commander, who is always primarily concerned with the support of front line troops, could
not be expected to appreciate properly the true role and capabilities of Strategic Air Forces
and would therefore misuse them.”45 As the Joint Force commander, Eisenhower had to
fight for command of the Strategic Air Forces “for the preparatory stages of the assault” and
secure the establishment of the beachhead.46 Nevertheless, Eisenhower recognized that direct
command would be limited to the crisis period, and only then because the D-Day endeavor
was exceptionally perilous. Normally, airpower’s ability to attack targets nearly anywhere in
support of the overall objectives of the war made confining activities to the support of a single
land operation foolish.47

Command and Control
The second and more important problem with the Joint staff organization and
processes is based on the unheeded lessons of experience, both historical and recent.
. Alex Grynkewich and Antonio J. Goldstrom, “The AEFT Today: Enabling Mission Command of Airpower,”
Air & Space Power Journal 34, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 4–19.
43. Brien Alkire et al., Command and Control of Joint Air Operations in the Pacific: Methods for Comparing and Contrasting
Alternative Concepts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).

44. Richard Mackenzie, “A Conversation with Chuck Horner,” Air Force Magazine 74, no. 6 (June 1991): 57–64;
Rebecca Grant, “Horner’s Gulf War,” Air Force Magazine 99, no. 3 (March 2016): 22–26; and Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner,
Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign (New York: Berkley Books, 1999).
45. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe: A Personal Account of World War II (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1952), 221–22.
46.
47.

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 221–22.

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 221–22.
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Namely, neither the decision-making processes nor the guidance at Joint warfighting
headquarters matches what these headquarters actually do or should do.
The record is clear and overwhelming. Most guidance issued by Joint warfighting
headquarters takes on the nature of the commander’s intent, leaving the traditional
detailed planning and execution to the air, maritime, and land commands, often
with the staffs of these subordinate commands liaising directly with one another as
necessary. As General John Yeosock, former US Army Central commander, stated
clearly about the matter after the Persian Gulf War, “The CINC [General Norman
Schwarzkopf] said, ‘I’m the concept man, you all work out the details.’ That was the
key to the absolute trust and confidence we had in each other and to our extremely
close teamwork.”48 This aspect of Joint warfighting staffs might seem counterintuitive
because these staffs conduct an enormous amount of planning and orders production.
Most of that work is very actionable and thorough, but it is also not correctly focused.
The problem’s root lies in the Joint warfighting command’s functioning through
J-structure staffs and the associated doctrinal planning processes. On paper, this
process starts with the Joint Force commander providing guidance or intent to his
or her Joint staff and the staff, under the direction of the chief of staff, entering the
Joint Planning Process. The process usually involves some combination of the J3
(Operations), J35 (Future Operations), and J5 (Plans) leading a planning effort whereby
courses of action are produced, evaluated, adopted, fleshed out, and turned into orders
under the direction of the commander. The concern is twofold. This process is based
almost solely on the Army’s approach to leading its specific formations in war and is
primarily driven by an inexperienced staff dominated by the members of the service
headquarters converted into the Joint headquarters. In other words, the structure
and functioning of Joint warfighting headquarters emphasize Army-specific detailed
planning and does not facilitate—and sometimes actually impedes—a Joint approach.
A better approach, often informally and imperfectly adopted (without doctrinal
guidance) by historical and recent Joint warfighting commands, refocuses the
structure and decision-making processes on the more conceptual nature of high
command and planning. Joint ad hoc command team meetings with the Joint
commander making decisions and issuing guidance in close cooperation with the
air, maritime, and land commanders in conference is the simplest form of this process.
Although referred to by different names (“war councils,” “command councils,”
or, as in Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force,
“Supreme Commander’s conferences”), in these meetings, senior commanders
collaborate to develop their intent and make decisions as to the overall
48. JCS, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, January 10, 1995), A-4.
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Joint operational approach.49 These commanders bring their component
perspectives and staff planning efforts to the meetings. The commanders then take the
agreed-upon Joint operational approach back to their respective service headquarters
to guide detailed planning and the issuance of orders by the air, maritime, and land
command staffs via their processes and best practices. Regular meetings drive an
iterative process whereby the developing situation guides and reshapes the concept.
Absent such an ad hoc arrangement (and even given daily videoconferences between the
Joint commander and the component commanders, at best), the current process has the
individual Joint commander serving as the single filter through which all component
perspectives on the mission are shared with his or her Joint staff. Then, as described
earlier, the staff (with all its limitations) develops the concept while following a process
focused on detailed planning. This process occurred in the Persian Gulf War, for
example, when multiple Joint and service-specific planning staffs worked on detailed
plans independently (see “Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War”).
The repeated examples show the Joint operational approach concept is the main
business of Joint warfighting commands at the highest levels. These more conceptual
approaches are developed by the Joint commanders working together. Meanwhile,
the component command staffs handle the detailed planning and order production.
In the current system, the two functions are out of sync; as a result, the structure and
processes at the Joint headquarters need reworking.
This problem is not new. After World War II, the Armed Forces Staff College in
Norfolk, Virginia, began producing the Staff Officers’ Manual for Joint Operations for
educational purposes. Unlike more recent versions and the equivalent Joint doctrine,
the first manual focused on the functioning of Joint commands for armed conflict.
The 1949–50 edition includes a telling graphic (see figure 2).50 Then, Joint warfighting
commands had two structures: one for command and another for the staff. These
organizational structures are still in place today. The problem then—and today—
is linking these two structures.

49. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1954).
50. Armed Forces Staff College, Staff Officers’ Manual for Joint Operations, 2nd rev. ed. (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff
College, 1949), 4.
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Figure 2. Joint command organization, Staff Officers’ Manual for Joint Operations, 1949
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Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War
For the Persian Gulf War, what became the full, four-phase campaign plan was two separate
plans grafted together over a period of at least five months. The first three phases were the air
campaign, developed by the Air Staff in Washington, DC, and adjusted by the US Air Forces
Central staff, all beginning in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The
fourth phase was a ground campaign to liberate Kuwait.
The planning for the ground phase began in September under the direction of General
Norman Schwarzkopf (the CENTCOM commander in chief ), along with his chief of staff
and J5 (Plans) chief, but with the major work being done by a team of four School of Advanced
Military Studies planners under Lieutenant Colonel Joe Purvis. United States Central
Command hastily assembled this team from around the world in mid-September. Luckily, the
team had months to develop and plan options for the conduct of the ground war.
The ad hoc Purvis planning cell floated among commands. While General Yeosock (US
Army Central) was not designated as the land commander, his responsibilities included acting
as the Third US Army field army commander. In this capacity, Yeosock received updates from
the Purvis cell and other elements of Schwarzkopf ’s headquarters, but Yeosock had no direct
control over these key planners for the ground campaign. Likewise, the Purvis team worked
with some air planners but with limited direct contact with General Charles Horner, the air
commander, and little-to-no contact with General Walter Boomer, the marine commander, or
Admiral Stanley Arthur, the naval commander.

Instead, the major components and planners at various levels worked together through a
complicated ad hoc system of liaisons, briefings, and informal meetings. During the planning
period in 1990–91, no regular process existed for bringing the component commanders
together. The Army commanders and their staffs—from Schwarzkopf to Yeosock to the corps
and divisions—worked in concert to influence Schwarzkopf ’s thinking, but the component
commanders did not develop the Joint concept of the campaign together. Schwarzkopf ’s team
worked for two months and shifted from the one-corps to two-corps approach to the ground
war before even talking to General Boomer and the Marines, let alone the Navy commanders.
Likewise, General Horner ran the air campaign, even into the ground phase, at best in parallel
to the work of the Purvis group. Once combat began, Schwarzkopf held daily update briefings
with his coalition and component commanders or their representatives—not as councils, but to
share Schwarzkopf ’s decisions.51

51. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 1995); Steven Weingartner, ed., In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert
Storm (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds.,
The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: US Army Center
for Military History, 1995); Robert H. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1993); Richard M. Swain, “Lucky War”: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997); and Clancy and Horner, Every Man a Tiger.
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The component commanders only acted jointly on a case-by-case basis—such as when
Boomer relied on Yeosock to handle supply matters. These periodic cases worked well enough
because the individual commanders emphasized trust in personal relationships. Admiral
Arthur supported this claim when he said, “[W]hat carried the day was that we, the component
commanders, shook hands and said ‘We’re not going to screw this up, we’re going to make it
work’. And it did.”52 Arthur had a point, but Joint command should depend upon more than a
handshake.

52.

JCS, Joint Warfare, A-4.
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An Alternative Approach:
The American Expeditionary Force
Organization of the American Expeditionary Force
The recommendation then becomes to build the American Expeditionary
Force by combining the two charts—to place the component commanders
formally in the Joint headquarters between the Joint commander
and the chief of staff. The component commanders form a command
council within this organizational structure, together with the Joint commander
and deputy commander. The Joint commander still makes the final decisions, but
together, the command council, not the Joint staff, develops the concept for the Joint
operational approach.
Such an approach would also require reorganizing the AEF headquarters.
Current Joint doctrine for the formation of JTF headquarters explicitly
recognizes the standard J-staff structure has not been ideal. Joint Publication
(JP) 3-33 offers different options, including organizing the staff around planning,
communication, protection, sustainment, and information management
or missions such as political, military, reconstruction, communications
synchronization, and securit y. Similarly, when Joint Enabling
Capabilities Command prepares its general-purpose planners
to spin up JTF staffs, the command does not organize them by J-codes. Instead,
it bins them in the functions of knowledge management, operations, intelligence,
public affairs, planning, and sustainment, while also sending separate experts to set
up communications systems.53
This idea of reorganizing around functions more closely aligned with Joint command
problems has a long pedigree. For example, although Eisenhower’s staff under General
Walter Bedell Smith was built around the standard G-staff structure, the staff included
new sections and cells created as necessary to deal with specific matters, such as
psychological warfare and civil affairs.54
These other organizational options that abandon the J-codes in their entirety
have rarely, if ever, been adopted, but the problem persists—which is why JTF
headquarters have created a cumbersome system of functional or mission cells and
centers imperfectly aligned with the J-staff structure. Figure II-6 in JP 3-33, “Notional
Joint Task Force Staff Organization” (see figure 3 below), illustrates the result—
53.

54.

JCS, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Publication 3-33 (Washington, DC: JCS, January 31, 2018).
Pogue, Supreme Command, 66–97.
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a labyrinth of headquarters and staff positions and relationships.55 More to the point,
this busy structure does not depict the relationships of the JTF headquarters to the air,
land, maritime, etc., component commanders, headquarters, and staffs. Slaving the
headquarters to the J-staff (really, the G-staff) structure overcomplicates an already
complicated problem.
The complexity of figure 3 shows how a J-staff structure is not ideal for Joint
warfighting headquarters. Instead of relying on the traditional J-staff structure, the
American Expeditionary Force is built to provide a headquarters that is optimized
for decision-making support to the commander through direct interaction from the
deputy commander and the component commanders.

55.

JCS, Joint Task Force Headquarters, II-22.
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Figure 3. “Notional Joint Task Force Staff Organization” from JP 3-33
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This organizational structure does not attempt to reinvent the wheel. Besides
bringing the component commanders more directly into the organization and clarifying
how they work with the Joint commander, much of this organization is familiar.
The core of the headquarters is the commander; the deputy commander, and the
command council, which consists of the component commanders and, if necessary,
the service force commanders, coalition force commanders, and other commanders
as required. The command council could include special operations, cyber, US Space
Force, and artificial intelligence, etc. As a baseline, the component commanders
should consist of a maritime commander, an air commander, and a land commander.
A special operations commander and one or more allied commanders are often required in
combined operations. These commanders simultaneously sit on the command council to
participate in the AEF headquarters activities and command their specific components.
Because the actual responsibilities within Joint Task Forces have often not followed
the exact Joint Force Air Component Commander, Maritime Component Commander,
and Land Component Commander naming conventions and associated doctrinal
responsibilities, the recommendation here is to give these positions the simpler and more
universally accurate titles of air commander, maritime commander, land commander,
special operations commander, and marine forces commander, etc. For instance, this
naming convention would allow the AEF air commander to focus on the mission and
operations of the American Expeditionary Force while coordinating with the theater-level
Joint Force Air Component Commander to establish a greater balance of theater-wide and
global air missions.
Eisenhower’s Command Council
Eisenhower said the following about the functioning of his headquarters:
“[W]ith command over ground, air, and naval forces, we had understood and
studied certain desirabilities in a truly integrated staff with approximately equal
representation from each of the ground, air, naval, and logistic organizations. . . .
We finally abandoned the idea as being expensive in personnel, and not necessary
in our situation. The scheme which we found most effective, where it was possible
for all commanders to meet together almost instantly, was to consider the naval,
air, and ground chiefs as occupying two roles. In the first role each was part of my
staff and he and his assistants worked with us in the development of plans; in the
second role each was the responsible commander for executing his part of the whole
operation.”56

56.

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 221.
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Historical and recent experiences, along with ongoing efforts in the Joint
Force, point to the necessity of creating another command-level position in Joint
warfighting headquarters: the sustainment commander. The United States’ first modern
expeditionary force identified this problem. As a result, General John Pershing created
a Services of Supply for the American Expeditionary Forces. Pershing saw their role
as so important that he put General James Harbord, his trusted first chief of staff, in
command of the organization.57 The various World War II headquarters dealt with
the same issue. They also struggled to figure out what to do with the variously named
services of supply, communication zones, theaters of operation, and theater armies.
In recent years, this ongoing concern has led to an effort to assign the
primary sustainment responsibility to the theater army—usually, the
theater Army service component command. Problems, however, may arise
from assigning the main sustainment responsibility to the theater army.
For instance, General Yeosock, commander of US Army Central during the Persian Gulf
War, struggled to balance his responsibilities as the Army component, theater army, and
numbered field army commander.58
In sum, Joint warfighting headquarters require a sustainment commander on the
command council to provide essential input and command of sustainment within the
area of operations, but, like the component commanders, this commander would have
responsibilities beyond the council. The critical difference is the commander’s other
responsibilities do not just narrow to the component; they broaden out to the theater.
The proposed members of the command council should be considered provisional
and subject to testing via experiment by the American Expeditionary Forces. Various
American Expeditionary Forces might find the component commands should be more
functional than domain-based. American Expeditionary Forces might also opt for
a mix of functional, component, and senior service force commanders. Regardless,
a Joint command council is essential to these recommendations. Figure 4 depicts a
generic framework for organizing an American Expeditionary Force.

57. Leo P. Hirrel, Supporting the Doughboys: US Army Logistics and Personnel during World War I (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2017), 41–69; and Leo P. Hirrel, “World War I and the Emergence of Modern Army
Sustainment,” in ed., Keith R. Beurskens, The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat
Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2018), 1–14.
58. John J. Yeosock, “Army Operations in the Gulf Theater,” Military Review 71, no. 9 (September 1991): 3–15; and
John Bonin, “Echelons above Reality: Armies, Army Groups, and Theater Armies/Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs),”
in Crow and Bailey, Essential to Success, 251–69.
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Confusion in Sustainment Commands
For all the positive attributes of General Eisenhower’s command arrangements in the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the incorporation of sustainment remained unsettled
and unclear throughout the campaign. The story is convoluted, but it involved Eisenhower
ordering the consolidation of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, with
Headquarters, US Army Services of Supply, into a larger European Theater of Operations, US
Army headquarters commanded directly by Eisenhower (in addition to his role as SHAEF
commander). With Eisenhower focused on SHAEF business, European Theater of Operations,
US Army, was run by General J. C. H. Lee, the former US Army Services of Supply commander,
who had direct connections with the Army’s national Army Service Forces.
Once established on the continent, Lee would command the Communications Zone, the
Army’s doctrinal overseas supply formation. Despite attempts by the Department of War and
Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s SHAEF chief of staff, the roles and responsibilities of these
relationships—especially the connection of the sustainment headquarters with the G1 and G4
at SHAEF headquarters—were never delineated. The muddled command-and-control structure
could not synchronize national, service, and coalition sustainment efforts, let alone with the
combat operations directed by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. As a result,
supply issues plagued the force from the Normandy Invasion to the end of the war in Europe.59
Such organizational confusion marked sustainment efforts in the Pacific theater, and the
confusion has continued to the present day, in part because of the confusing name and role
of the theater army. Similar to Eisenhower commanding the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force; the European Theater of Operations, US Army; and the land components,
in the Persian Gulf War, Yeosock commanded “three armies”: the Army component command
(US Army Central), the theater army, and Third US Army. As the theater army commander,
Yeosock had to work with a labyrinth of national Joint and service support entities and theater
Joint, service, and subordinate “echelon above corps” headquarters.
The key to Yeosock’s sustainment efforts in theater was the creation of the US Army Central
Support Command (also called 22nd Support Command) under General William Pagonis.
Pagonis effectively became the Joint sustainment commander and did impressive work in that
role. As in several other Joint commands discussed throughout this study, the element of luck
was involved in Pagonis’s selection. Pagonis had been at US Army Forces Command; the Army
brought him in at the start of the crisis as a “hired-gun” (in his words).60 Pagonis had never been
to United States Central Command, and only through his vast experiences and Joint and service
contacts did he manage to make Yeosock’s theater army work.61

59. Pogue, Supreme Command, 73–74; and D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2010), 612–757.

60. William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 1992), 74.
61.

Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 74; and Yeosock, “Army Operations,” 8–13.
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With the command council in place, the new AEF headquarters requires
a staff to support the headquarters. This staff should be organized into
Joint centers and cells, not J-staff sections. The headquarters processes
and products will be covered in more detail later, but the essential
concept is organizing the staff to optimize support for the more concept-heavy decision making
of the command council. Further, any structures and processes recommended here should
maximize flexibility in the staff organization so each command council can shape and
reshape a structure best suited to the council’s unique missions.
Two implications arise from these assertions. First, most centers and cells should
not solely focus on the details of various associated activities and operations. Instead,
their primary role is to act as a clearinghouse, collator, and synchronizer of their
activities and those of the component headquarters in the expeditionary force. This
role points to creating an intelligence center or intelligence support element, a logistics
operations center, operations center, a targeting or fires center, a cyber and electronic
warfare center, and an information warfare center. The staff could create working
groups to fill temporary needs that may become cells or even centers if a need becomes
persistent. Second, the headquarters structure cannot take over the development
of concepts from the command council, which places signif icant
restrictions on the duties of traditional planning and operations
sections. Both implications—the organization of the centers
and the planning and operations sections, which need to be restricted—require a greater
explanation that intersects with the reformed approaches to command and planning
in Joint warfighting commands.
Setting the Theater with the American Expeditionary Force
Given the historical tendency for the Army to take the lead in theater sustainment and
the recent assignment of sustainment responsibilities to the Army, one possibility is that
the position of sustainment commander could be held simultaneously by the Army service
component commander or the deputy commander of the theater.62 Deploying the Army
service component command as the core of a hastily formed Joint Task Force has almost always
overburdened the headquarters as it attempts to meet its day-to-day responsibilities. But, in
this proposed arrangement, the assumption of an active role on an AEF command council
aligns with the Army service component command’s day-to-day responsibilities for setting
the theater, allowing the sustainment commander to provide input to the council and direction
to the forces that balances the needs of the theater area of responsibility and the AEF Joint
operations area.

62. Duane A. Gamble, “Anticipating Joint Force Requirements,” US Army (website), May 24, 2021, https://www.army.mil
/article/246742/anticipating_joint_force_requirements.
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The American Expeditionary Force
and the Joint Warfighting Operations Process

While components of the current Joint Planning Process are useful for command
and planning within the proposed American Expeditionary Force, the process as
a whole does not match the needs of a Joint warfighting command for three main
reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the process emerges from and is optimized primarily
for Army operations, leading to varying degrees of disconnect with the thinking and
processes of the other services and impeding Jointness as a result. Second, in recent
years, and especially in current Joint doctrine, the Joint Planning Process has become
almost solely dedicated to planning at the combatant command level, which is oriented
toward a definition of campaigns as long-term efforts for ongoing competition and
cooperation across the competition continuum. The mechanics of such extensive
planning at combatant commands is beyond the purview of this paper, but suffice it to
say that it does not match the dynamics of command and planning performed at Joint
warfighting headquarters for and in armed conflict. For example, flexible deterrent
and response options are central to planning for competition, but they are largely
irrelevant to Joint warfighting. Third, to the degree the Joint Planning Process does
deal with command and planning in armed conflict, the process is not optimized for
the proposed structure of the American Expeditionary Force, in which Joint decision
making is led by a command council.
The American Expeditionary Force thus requires its own Joint warfighting
operations process. While this study will not produce a fully developed doctrinal
manual for such a process, some essentials can be outlined. Fundamental to this
process is the understanding that within the American Expeditionary Force, the
decision making and guidance from the command council begin as conceptual and
grow more detailed as they work the way down through the centers and component
commands to the tactical units. In turn, the development of the details at the tactical
units, component commands, and centers gets fed back to the command council to
inform the refinement of the concepts. Figure 5 shows how this process might work
in an American Expeditionary Force.
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Figure 5. Proposed Joint warfighting operations process

Role of the Command Council
In practice, the command council should focus on the developing and
producing commandintent, not detailed operation orders. To put the concept in
existing Joint terms, the command council should focus on interpreting strategic
guidance, gain a fuller appreciation of the strategic and operational environment,
grasp and define the dynamics of the problem, and develop an operational approach
for the Joint command. Expressed differently by the different services, these efforts fall
within any commander’s mandate to understand, decide, act, and assess, all with an
eye toward decentralized execution. In terms of actual products, the command
council’s decision making produces command directives, concepts of operations,
base plans, or similar products as the situation demands. The command council’s
ongoing discussions should not be oriented on any more detail than required to
populate these types of documents.63
63. Navy Warfare Development Command, Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Norfolk, VA: Navy Warfare
Development Command, April 2020), 37–53; US Air Force Doctrine, The Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Publication 1
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air Force Doctrine, March 10, 2021), 12–14; Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC),
Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQMC, April 4, 2018); and Headquarters,
Department of the Army (HQDA), Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0
(Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2019).
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Fundamentally, the command council should maintain a longer-term focus on
achievinggoals, establish conditions for favorable crisis resolution, and transition
post-crisis to improved conditions in competition and cooperation below the level of
armed conflict. To accomplishthese tasks, the command council would define and
refine the command’s expressed objectives and military end states and consider how
these objectives and end states support national and theater-level intent across the
competition continuum.
Role of the Command Council in Doctrine, Concepts, Design, and Planning
The arrangement and focus of the AEF command council are ideal for a dynamic
and integrated application of nonsynchronous Joint and service efforts on doctrine and
concepts. Joint doctrine offers numerous ideas, including principles of Joint operations,
Joint functions, factors of operational design, and elements of operational design, to
merge into operational design. The Joint Force also regularly develops new versions
of the Joint warfighting concept, which, although provisional, includes additional
considerations for the conception of Joint operations. At the same time, each of the
services has developed its doctrine and best practices for designing campaigns and
operations in armed conflict while following its cycle of producing future warfighting
operating concepts.
These designs and concepts are valuable precisely because they are not the same.
They represent what the specific Joint and domain experts have determined are the
best ways for their forces to fight inside and out of a Joint command. Instead of trying
to force an artificial alignment of the doctrine and concepts of the Joint Force and
various services, which would erode capabilities optimized to a particular domain,
the command council brings together the whole menu of doctrine and concepts.
More importantly, the council brings the doctrine and concepts together at the right
point—where the services fight together as a Joint Force. As the AEF commander,
with the help of the command council, craft the command’s intent to drive the
production of command directives, concepts of operations, and base plans, the
commander and council will consider the relevant Joint operational design factors and
concepts. Each commander will also bring his or her service’s campaigning factors and
concepts. Depending on the command and its specific mission and problem set, some
service-specific approaches might be more widely applicable, while others may
not. The work of command councils in trying to apply the variety of doctrine and
concepts to their real-world warfighting problems thus becomes a better way of
practicing Joint command and an ideal way of experimenting with and developing
doctrine and concepts.
Similarly, the command council is an ideal place to practice and apply design
thinking. The introduction of design thinking into service and Joint doctrine over
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the past few decades has not gone smoothly because of the esoteric and often baffling
nature of theory behind design and systems approaches. As such, design has often
been treated as the practice of a select few experts schooled in the theory and assigned
to special cells buried in plans shops. Many do not see design’s value or think it is
something military headquarters already does in its normal planning processes.
Design and systems thinking remains, in one form or another, in Joint doctrine and
education and the doctrine and education of most of the services.
The makeup and conceptual focus of the AEF command council make it a
perfect place to practice design thinking. Joint design focuses on understanding
strategic guidance, the operational environment, and the problem and developing
operational approaches. The AEF commander would continue to serve as the primary
conduit of formal strategic guidance to the command. The other commanders
on the council, drawing on their own experiences and directions, are better suited to
assist the commander in interpreting the guidance than more junior staff planners
in traditional Joint Task Forces. Likewise, the command council, drawing on senior
experts in a various services and domains, provides a richer picture for understanding
the totality of the operational environment and problem.
Most important, and often missed, in design thinking is the value of considering,
applying, and adjusting various operational approaches, not just developing them.
Because of their background and supported by their command and staff, each member
of the command council will have a different preferred operational approach for
the proposed AEF campaign or operation. These different approaches—aired out,
thought through, debated, and picked apart in the command council—act as mental
experimentation with the system, forcing the commanders to consider what they might
do and how the system might react. These experiments (mental war games) provide an
enriched understanding of the environment and problem and will no doubt produce a
balanced, hybrid operational approach. In other words, when all service commanders
participate, they create a truly Joint operational design.
The AEF headquarters does not require a traditional planning section with a
functioning command council. The command council takes the long-term, holistic
view and then develops and adjusts the commander’s intent accordingly in a way even
the best planners would struggle to achieve.
Role of the AEF Staff Centers and Components
What do the centers on the AEF staff do? The AEF staff centers sit in the
middle of the conceptual-to-detailed spectrum, thereby linking the concepts of the
command councils to the more detailed planning and operations of the components.
As such, the staff centers serve two mutually reinforcing purposes. First, the staff
centers bring together and coordinate the efforts of the appropriate staff liaisons
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from the components and other relevant organizations related to the center’s
function. Second, the staff centers prepare and provide center estimates to support
the decision making of the command council.
It is perhaps best to think of each center as a mini-command council, only as a
functionally aligned staff council (see figure 4). A chief at the AEF headquarters
leads each center, supported by administrative staff as required. The center’s key
members would come from the components or other related organizations. Together,
the key members develop the center’s estimates. For example, an intelligence center
(or intelligence support element) would regularly bring together intelligence
officers from each component and representatives from other intelligence services as
required. These individuals would share the more detailed products of their respective
commands’ intelligence efforts and help produce Joint intelligence estimates for use by
the command council. Then, intimately informed by the Joint efforts in their center,
these individuals would bring that perspective back to their components with an
improved awareness of how to accomplish their more detailed intelligence efforts in
concert with the other components. The other AEF centers would operate similarly
and with a similar purpose.
The centers internal to the AEF staff need cross-functional activities. All
staff activities would develop a battle rhythm under the direction of the chief of
staff, starting with the individual centers regularly meeting with representatives
from the various functionally similar components and organizations. Then,
by necessity and guided by the chief of staff, the centers would set up
cross-functional meetings to enable an integrated perspective in the preparation
of their estimates. The centers would then develop and deliver their estimates to
the command council. The council would make the necessary decisions and refine
command guidance as required.
The specifics of the American Expeditionary Force’s battle rhythm are best left
to each AEF staff, leaving room for it to develop its own best practices. Experience
shows that well-developed personal relationships are the best enabler of cooperation.
Permanent American Expeditionary Forces that regularly plan and exercise together
will have already developed these personal relationships and will bypass the need to
establish them on the fly. Further, such an arrangement would allow for experimentation
with the greater use of artificial intelligence in the production of estimates, aggregation
and interpretation of data; the linking of cross-functional activities; war gaming; and
the development of assessments.64
64. Kathleen McKendrick, The Application of Artificial Intelligence in Operations Planning (Brussels: NATO Science and
Technology Organization, October 2017); and Forrest E. Morgan et al., Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical
Concerns in an Uncertain World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020).
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D-Day: Staffs Informing the Command Council
When Eisenhower’s command team was already well developed, his conceptual guidance
well established and widely known, and his components had already issued and set in motion
the detailed orders for D-Day, the team came together in regular Supreme Commander’s
conferences in late May and early June to receive weather briefings from Group Captain
J. M. Stagg, the chief of the Meteorological Committee, and to make the final decision whether
to launch the invasion. Throughout the conferences, the requisite staff center gave the team
the details, and the component commanders made recommendations based on the weather’s
effects on their domain. Still, the decision was the commander’s, and in the early morning of
June 5, with the full support of his command council, Eisenhower made the final call to go.65

Essential to these staff efforts is an understanding that producing detailed plans
and orders in line with current contingency operation plans (OPLANs) and crisis
operation orders (OPORDs) is not the job of the AEF headquarters. Current planning
doctrine is imperfect in precisely defining the intention. As noted earlier, the AEF
headquarters focuses on no more detail than required to produce intent along the lines
of requirements in current command directives, concepts of operations, base plans, and,
perhaps, fragmentary orders. The specific format of AEF-level command directives
and plans is beyond the purview of this study and can and should be developed by
experimentation in the headquarters. For example, the current commander’s estimate
is problematic because the doctrinal format requires mission analysis, centers of gravity,
and courses of action, all of which are concepts that point toward an abbreviated Joint
Planning Process, which is not ideal for Joint warfighting command for the reasons
described earlier.
Along these lines, it is important to note there is no AEF “planning center,” and
the AEF operations center would not take on the responsibilities of the current J3
or J5. Instead, the AEF operations center would be focused more closely on the
role of the current Joint operations center, which focuses on the flow of information
with the intent to monitor, assess, and produce physical estimates, plans, orders,
and fragmentary orders for direction. This role perhaps points to the creation of
an assessment cell or war-gaming cell—enabled by artificial intelligence—in the
center that manages assessment and war games in the preparation of estimates for
the command council. The operations center is the main information clearinghouse
for the command headquarters. It tracks the execution and progress of the fight in
concert with the staff members from the components who have a similar function.
The operations center does not do the planning. Its staff members do not prepare
65. Pogue, Supreme Command, 169–70; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 249–50; and Tom Rives, “ ‘OK, We’ll Go’: Just What
Did Ike Say When He Launched the D-Day Invasion 70 Years Ago?,” Prologue 46, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 36–43.
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the draft operational approach, commander’s intent, estimates, plans, or orders for
approval by the command council. The members of the command council do their
own planning at the conceptual level; their approaches and decisions are captured
by representatives from the operations center, put into the appropriate format, and
published for dissemination to the command.
Additional Roles and Products of the American Expeditionary Force
This thumbnail version of the proposed Joint warfighting operations process points
to an additional important role for the permanent American Expeditionary Forces
in the Joint Strategic Planning System related to the responsibilities of the operations
center. Although the focus here has been on the organization and functioning
of American Expeditionary Forces for the dynamics of warfighting, their nature as
a permanent headquarters means that in competition below armed conflict, they
will be engaged in preparation for various contingencies within their assigned
theaters. In other words, American Expeditionary Forces are also well suited for
writing and testing contingency operation plans, a responsibility currently residing
at the combatant commands.
Pushing at least part of this responsibility to the American Expeditionary Forces
is vitally important. Eisenhower said, “Peace-time plans are of no particular value,
but peace-time planning is indispensable” because the warfighting plans developed in
peacetime never match the actual war, but the planning during peacetime causes the
planners to gain an invaluable appreciation of the types of problems they will confront
and the possible means and ways they will have to pursue the mission in war.66 “That
is the reason it is so important to plan,” Eisenhower advised, “to keep yourselves
steeped in the character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve—
or to help to solve . . . you must plan, you must learn, you must steep yourself in these
problems.”67 The authors of this study have not found a single instance in which a
Joint Task Force used a combatant command contingency OPLAN in the current
system, and those who produced the OPLANs have rarely (if ever) been members
of the Joint Task Forces that dealt with the contingency. In other words, neither the
peacetime plans nor the planning have had any value in the sense Eisenhower meant.
The production and validation of OPLANs in the current system represent an
enormous effort on the part of the same combatant command staff members who are
also responsible for the essential task, as evidenced by a new JP 3-0 focused entirely
on the matter of developing theater strategies and command campaign plans across
66. Eisenhower to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, December 31, 1950, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
ed. Louis Galambos (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 11:1516.
67. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1957 (Washington, DC:
Office of the Federal Register, 1958), 818–19.
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the competition continuum. The OPLANs in the current system are of limited use
in the initial design and designation of Joint Task Forces. The OPLANs are most
valuable for providing combatant command input on force development. Pushing at
least part of the contingency planning to the permanent American Expeditionary
Forces would be more beneficial for force development and a perfect example of the
value of peacetime planning in Eisenhower’s view.
The requirement to produce complete contingency OPLANs warrants an addendum
to the proposed AEF Joint warfighting operations process and the responsibilities of
the operations center. In competition below armed conflict, the process would still
function as described, with the command council focused on conceptual planning
and the centers gathering the details produced by the components. For the production
of the complete contingency OPLANs, the operations center would collect, format,
and publish the complete orders. Ideally, as many of these plans as possible would be
war-gamed and exercised by the American Expeditionary Forces. Just as they are in
the current system, the final products would be used by the combatant commands,
the Joint Force, and the Department of Defense. In addition to being better for force
development and informing the combatant commands’ approach to guiding and
supporting the operations of the American Expeditionary Forces, such contingency
OPLANs would provide the national command authority, the chairman, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with the real-world pieces that go into a globally integrated national
strategy for the entire competition continuum.
Application of the AEF Framework to Combatant Commands
The continuous nature of American Expeditionary Forces compared with ad hoc
Joint Task Forces results in two distinct modes of operation: contingency and crisis
response and peacetime operations. Understanding how an American Expeditionary
Force would operate during these different modes is important in articulating how
the relationship of the force to a geographic combatant command is structured.
Directing how combatant commanders would control the operations of an American
Expeditionary Force for different contingencies in various AORs would not be
productive here. Showing advantages an American Expeditionary Force would have
offered in prior operations, analyzing possible AEF proposals for current and future
operations, and providing recommendations for how an American Expeditionary
Force can be best used during peacetime operations are useful.
Although the smallest of the geographic combatant commands, United States
Southern Command provides a case study in which many of the tenets within
the AEF construct were partially applied and can be analyzed. During his
time as the USSOUTHCOM commander from 2016–18, Admiral Kurt Tidd
identified three areas that comprised the bulk of United States Southern Command’s
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main efforts: countering transregional and transnational threat networks, rapidly
responding to crises, and building relationships within the region.68 Joint Task
Force Bravo, a forward-based, standing expeditionary task force within the
USSOUTHCOM AOR, was involved with countering transregional and
transnational threat networks and routinely responded to crises within the area.
Using an expeditionary and continuously operating Joint command to handle
contingency operations allowed the USSOUTHCOM commander to focus on
building relationships, arguably the most vital area during peacetime operations.
United States Southern Command also put together different “communities of
interest” and “cross-directorate teams” to counter the transregional and transnational
threat networks mission successfully. These groups included multiple nations and
interagency partners, and the members spanned J-codes within the USSOUTHCOM
staff.69 The purpose of the groups was like the one envisioned for the AEF centers
(operational, intelligence, logistics, etc.). Even with only a partial application of the
AEF structure and processes, United States Southern Command experienced outsize
success. But Joint Task Force Bravo is not an American Expeditionary Force. No
command council provides guidance to the Joint Force commander, and the centers
described earlier are neither established at the Joint Task Force nor structured in
a manner that facilitates more efficient Joint operations.
United States Central Command and United States Africa Command are well
versed in conducting military, humanitarian, and stability operations via a Joint
Task Force. These operations have been performed professionally, and most have
achieved incredible successes. But, as many of the callout boxes throughout the study
(Afghanistan and Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve,
Joint Task Force Liberia, and the Persian Gulf War) have highlighted, these
successes were achieved despite significant inefficiencies in Joint headquarters
operations and structure. Establishing an American Expeditionary Force or multiple
American Expeditionary Forces within these AORs would enable a dedicated Joint
command to focus on the myriad military operations while allowing the
geographic combatant commanders to focus on day-to-day operations and
regional stability. Political, religious, economic, and diplomatic conditions within
the regions will likely lead to more conflicts and crises, further illustrating the need
for fundamental changes in how Joint operations are conducted.
But the conflicts and crises in United States Central Command and United States
Africa Command are small-scale compared to those possible within United States
European Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)
68. Kurt W. Tidd and Tyler W. Morton, “US Southern Command Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges,”
Joint Force Quarterly 86 (3rd Quarter 2017): 12.
69.

Tidd and Morton, “US Southern Command,” 13.
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in an increasingly multipolar world. Although wars against Russia and China are not
likely, such wars would be far more dangerous, and the US military must be ready for
possible large-scale combat operations. The USINDOPACOM area poses a unique,
robust set of challenges to which an American Expeditionary Force could provide
advantages. The region is dominated by malign Chinese influence, weak governments,
and periodic environmental or humanitarian crises. Aggressive Chinese behavior in
the South China Sea and the various responses by neighbors in the region further
complicate operations there.
Establishing an American Expeditionary Force focused on protecting
Taiwan and providing environmental disaster relief may alleviate the burdens
on the USINDOPACOM commander and advance the four critical areas
of the command’s strategy (see “The American Expeditionary Force in the
USINDOPACOM AOR”). With an American Expeditionary Force focused
on planning for Taiwan and natural and humanitarian disaster response, the
USINDOPACOM commander could concentrate on countering aggression within
the South China Sea and building a coalition of regional neighbors to support the
effort. Because many of these neighbors would be wary of partnering with a Joint
command focused on the defense of Taiwan, an American Expeditionary Force
with a natural and humanitarian disaster response mission would give the neighbors
a degree of separation from directly challenging China’s claim on Taiwan and
provide them with the opportunity to support a more stable South China Sea.
Similarly, an American Expeditionary Force in the EUCOM AOR could further
relationships and provide the posture necessary to deter Russian aggression in the
region (such as the Russian invasion of South Ossetia in 2008, the annexation
of Crimea in 2014, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022). Forming an American
Expeditionary Force in the EUCOM AOR would be more complex than developing
such a force in other regions because of NATO’s presence and the sheer number
of partners and allies in the region. Determining precisely how an American
Expeditionary Force would fit into any combatant command is beyond the scope of
this study. It is important, however, to highlight the American Expeditionary Force
to help manage the daily requirements directly tied to future Joint warfighting for
the combatant commander.
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The American Expeditionary Force in the USINDOPACOM AOR
The USINDOPACOM AOR would greatly benefit from an American Expeditionary Force
in the region. In the USINDOPACOM 2021 posture statement to Congress, Admiral Philip
Davidson states the following:
Absent a convincing deterrent, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be
emboldened to take action to undermine the rules-based international order and the
values represented in our vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The combination
of the PRC’s military modernization program and willingness to intimidate its
neighbors through the use, or threatened use of force, undermines peace, security,
and prosperity in the region.70

Furthermore, Davidson highlights four critical areas
great-power competition to advance American interests in the region.

for

addressing

 Increasing Joint Force lethality.

 Enhancing design and posture.

 Strengthening Allies and partners.

 Modernizing exercises, experimentation, and innovation programs.71

The American Expeditionary Force would provide a Joint headquarters that could focus
primarily on increasing Joint Force lethality, enhancing design and posture, and engaging in
exercises, experimentation, and innovation, freeing United States Indo-Pacific Command to
focus on military diplomacy and providing a convincing deterrent.

Contingencies and crises that do not fall within an American Expeditionary
Force’s assigned mission or threat will arise, just as events occur today that require the
establishment of a Joint Task Force. In these instances, the American Expeditionary
Force would still provide improved flexibility and distinct advantages over the current
construct due to its standing expeditionary headquarters within the AOR. Even
without the previous planning and execution experience associated with the specific
contingency or crisis, the American Expeditionary Force would already be operating
with the relationships, processes, and structures needed to be built from scratch to form
a Joint Task Force. Depending on the scale of the crisis, an American Expeditionary
Force could also form a Joint Task Force from within its components to address the
issue. Another option would be for the combatant commander to form an entirely new
Joint Task Force outside the American Expeditionary Force if he or she anticipated the
risk resulting from the degradation of the AEF’s primary missions as being too high.
70. United States Indo-Pacific Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of
Philip S. Davidson, commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command).
71.

United States Indo-Pacific Command.
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Their mission to execute military operations for various contingencies
notwithstanding, American Expeditionary Forces would likely spend much of
their time outside of contingency and crisis response. Historical efforts like the
AEF construct have failed to succeed because the role of such an entity was not
well understood or defined. After World War I, General Pershing led an effort to
reorganize the Army General Staff into the standard G structure with an added
War Plans Division. During peacetime, this division would produce war plans.
In war, the intention was to shift the War Plans Division into the core of a
warfighting headquarters, most likely under the command of the Chief of Staff. The
War Plans Division did a lot of war planning, but the division never deployed or even
prepared to serve as a warfighting field headquarters. Day-to-day responsibilities
within the interwar Army left the War Plans Division with neither the time nor
the senior personnel to serve such a role, and Chief of Staff General George C.
Marshall scrapped the idea at the outset of World War II.72 The Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was another effort to find a
solution to Joint warfighting during times of crisis. Combatant commanders in each
region would lead Joint warfighting commands in any contingency. The commanders’
day-to-day responsibilities, however, consistently overwhelm their decision cycle and
the bandwidth of their staff.
The AEF concept overcomes these efforts’ shortcomings through the conduct
of constant warfighting improvement. During peacetime operations, American
Expeditionary Forces would serve as warfighting labs for Joint and service concepts,
thus becoming key players in force development. The AEF headquarters would also
engage in OPLAN planning and run these plans through repetitive, arduous exercises
and war games to validate them. The exercises and war games would involve varying
degrees of participation from the components, and participation would be determined
by the combatant commands, AEF commands, and component commands. With
the benefit of assigned forces, American Expeditionary Forces would also develop
different component packages and rotate them as they are available and appropriate
for different problems. In this way, the American Expeditionary Forces would not be
simply planning entities in peacetime; rather, the forces would be active leaders in the
force development of Joint and service forces. American Expeditionary Forces would
be better equipped to succeed in this fashion because they would not be burdened
by many of the essential, numerous, day-to-day requirements for which combatant
commanders are responsible.
72. James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963 (Washington, DC:
US Army Center for Military History, 1975), 50–78; Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division,
United States Army in World War II: The War Department (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1951);
and Thomas Bruscino, Developing Strategists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Interwar Army War College, ed. Jessica J. Sheets
(Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2019).
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Implications and Conclusions
Implications of the American Expeditionary Force
for Concept Development
The Joint Force has asked the services to help to align efforts to maximize efficiency
and effectiveness. The disparate efforts, however, are still service-specific and focused
on allocating resources rather than Joint warfighting. The services “are working to
develop next generation capabilities from unmanned logistics platforms to expanded
mobility capabilities [that] will allow greater operational reach and flexibility to
maneuver commanders and planners.”73 In other words, each service has been tasked
with a portion of the Joint Warfighting Concept that entails researching, developing,
and implementing a capability to be shared across the Joint construct. The Air Force
is handling Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Navy is responsible
for Joint fires, and the Army is focusing on the concept of contested logistics.74
Each of these efforts is aligned with the strength of the service assigned, enabling
the use of established resources and concepts to further explore the capabilities.
The Joint Warfighting Concept and service efforts are not the only effort
underway at the Department of Defense, Joint, or service level to solidify the
Joint warfighting concept. The incorporation of a Joint fires element in geographic
combatant commands has been a useful exercise in ensuring Joint coordination
during operations and planning phases. As an integral part of the planning process,
one must question who owns Joint fires during combat operations. Does the value
of the Joint fires to the combatant command outweigh the coordination they
could bring to combat operations if Joint fires were to fall under an established
Joint Task Force? Although vital to the planning process, the critical Joint fires
element would most likely be even more effective under a Joint Task Force that
was executing sustained combat operations to coordinate across the platforms
in the region.
Since the early 2000s, decision dominance has been conceptualized as a means
for the United States to deprive an enemy of the ability to make decisions, thus
removing enemy leadership options to use available forces fully. In 2003, the stated
goal of decision dominance was to remove all viable options for enemy leadership,
not to destroy fielded enemy forces.75 As of 2021, the concept had transformed into
73. Frank Wolfe, “Joint Warfighting Concept Assumes ‘Contested Logistics,’ ” Defense Daily (website), October 6, 2020,
https://www.defensedaily.com/joint-warfighting-concept-assumes-contested-logistics/pentagon/.
74. Gamble, “Joint Force Requirements.”

75. Merrick E. Krause, “Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries,” Defense Horizons 23
(February 2003): 1.
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the ability for US or allied commanders to sense, understand, decide, and act faster
than the enemy.76 This transformation is not simply a matter of semantics; it shifts
the capability focus inward rather than on capabilities meant to degrade or disrupt
enemy operations. Achieving decision dominance in current or future combat
operations will require a fully Joint effort to ensure all services are supporting the
commander at the right time and in the desired manner. Disparate efforts across
the Joint Force cannot achieve this effect without seamless coordination by the
warfighting commander.
Each service is also involved in the development of service-specific
warfighting concepts that interact across domains and must be validated in
Joint operations. The Army’s effort in this arena is the multi-domain operations
(MDO) concept.77 The purpose of multi-domain operations is to force an
enemy to respond to multiple complementary threats individually, and the focus
of these operations is on the combination of dilemmas vice pure overmatch.
The concept centers on the future operating environment, including efforts in space
and cyberspace that increase the speed and potential lethality of operations at all
levels of conflict. Exercising this concept in a standing, Joint command, such as
an American Expeditionary Force, would dramatically increase the likelihood
of Joint Force interoperability and enable effective maneuver in all domains.78
Exercising this concept would provide Joint command and control across all
domains, synchronize intelligence activities theater-wide, test analytic methods of
high-volume data from intelligence collection assets, and connect sensors to
service-specific “shooters” in support of strategic and operational objectives.79
Executing MDO through the AEF construct also has added advantages that
derive from a potentially reduced footprint. Compared with larger, traditional
Joint forces, the American Expeditionary Force could be smaller yet just as capable
and more agile. This decreased size would drive budgeting and acquisition benefits
and potentially gain ally or partner-nation support more easily than a larger, more
disruptive US footprint on the ally or partner nation’s soil.
Recent naval (combined Navy and Marine Corps) warfighting concepts include
distributed maritime operations (DMO) and expeditionary advanced base operations
(EABO). Admiral Phillip Sawyer, then-deputy chief of naval operations for operations,
plans, and strategy, described distributed maritime operations as “a combination
76. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army’s New Aim Is ‘Decision Dominance,’ ” Breaking Defense (website), March 17, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/armys-new-aim-is-decision-dominance/.

77. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, US Army Training
and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command,
December 6, 2018), v–xii, 5–48.

78. Brian McCarthy, “Can an Army Multi-Domain Task Force Really Be Multi-Domain?” (white paper, US Army War
College, Carlisle, PA, 2021), 24.
79. McCarthy, “Multi-Domain Task Force,” 24.
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of distributed forces, integration of effects, and maneuver. These operations will
enhance battle space awareness and influence; generate opportunities for naval forces
to achieve surprise, neutralize threats and overwhelm the adversary; and impose
operational dilemmas on the adversary.”80 The EABO concept involves the employment
of mobile expeditionary forces from a series of temporary locations within a contested
maritime area to support fleet operations and access.81 These concepts offer great
warfighting potential, but they require refinement. In peacetime, the United States
knows how to command and control distributed forces as required for DMO, but it
must be practiced within a Joint construct in potentially contested or denied
environments to ensure efficacy.82 Similarly, EABO, still in the predoctrinal
considerations phase, must undergo experimentation to be perfected.83
Like MDO, DMO, and EABO, operations in the cyber and space domains
involve the dispersion of forces and effects, which relies on trust and confidence
within the command structure. This chain-of-command trust and confidence are
fundamental to the AEF concept. As with the understanding, intent, and trust
required for mission command, the American Expeditionary Force will have to
rely on guidance being translated into mission-specific plans and operations.84
The command council develops the overall strategy and then disseminates it to the
component staffs for detailed planning, enabling the service-specific chains of command
for these warfighting concepts to remain intact. Operations may be conducted in
accordance with the service concepts as a part of the Joint strategy. The services
need this freedom to refine and test the concepts the services are developing. While
using a service-specific concept to accomplish the mission might make sense,
a Joint concept may be better aligned with the commander’s intent. Freedom of effort
will be critical to the American Expeditionary Force’s effective, Joint operations.
While the specific services will fund and research these efforts, the proposed
organizational change presents a unique opportunity to test and evolve the
Joint warfighting efforts. The AEF structure will offer room—and, more
importantly, time—to test these concepts as a continuously established Joint Force.
Each service can and should bring its concepts and constructs to the American
Expeditionary Force to determine what is best suited for the region, enemy, or
forces provided. An example construct to enable this experimentation is to
assign different American Expeditionary Forces as focused Joint warfighting
80. Edward Lundquist, “DMO Is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea,” Seapower
(website), February 2, 2021, https://seapowermagazine.org/dmo-is-navys-operational-approach-to-winning-the-high-end-fight
-at-sea/.
81. HQMC, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (Washington, DC: HQMC, February 2021), 1-3–1-4.
82. Lundquist, “Navy’s Operational Approach.”
83.

HQMC, Tentative Manual, 1-1.

84. Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command” (white paper, JCS, Washington, DC, April 3, 2012).
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centers for service and Joint constructs. For instance, a EUCOM American
Expeditionary Force could be the lead for MDO, a USINDOPACOM American
Expeditionary Force could be the lead for DMO and EABO, and a CENTCOM
or United States Africa Command American Expeditionary Force could be the
lead for irregular warfare and stability operations experimentation. Regardless
of how the experimentation process is constructed, the American Expeditionary
Force would provide the Joint Force with a testing site for these individual
concepts to be coordinated and executed at the tactical and operational levels, thus
providing continuous feedback to the services.

Conclusion
Analysis of the historical record has shown, for several reasons, that Joint
warfighting is best conducted with a subordinate Joint warfighting command to the
geographic combatant commands. The complexity of the theaters and the demands of
great-power competition precludes the combatant commands from effectively
serving as Joint warfighting headquarters. Recognizing these conditions,
the US military has come to rely on the Joint task force as the principal
warfighting headquarters. But this reliance is problematic because the ad hoc,
post-crisis activation of Joint Task Forces inherently puts the United States at
a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will
maintain its competitive advantage by being a superior and sustainable Joint Force
sooner than its adversaries.
Although establishing standing warfighting headquarters modeled after the
current JTF organization would address the efficiency and effectiveness
inadequacies of the current approach, such a solution would not be complete.
In addition, receiving service buy-in, aligning with current Joint concept
development initiatives, or undergoing successful implementation without adding
additional force structure would be unlikely. Therefore, the findings suggest the
US military should formalize a standing Joint warfighting headquarters—
the American Expeditionary Force—around a command council and a staff
organized into Joint centers and cells.
The core of the headquarters would consist of the commander, the deputy
commander, and the command council, which would consist of the component
commanders and, if necessary, the service force commanders. The command
council comprises existing commands drawn from service formations that
are already aligned to specific theaters, and Joint centers and cells would
largely be staffed from these commands. Therefore, such an option would not
require a significant change in force structure. Furthermore, the American
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Expeditionary Force would provide the organizational structure to develop,
debate, and experiment with service and Joint concepts, playing to the strengths
of the services and the Joint Force. These are broad baseline recommendations;
they are not tailored to specific circumstances. Thus, they can and should be built
upon to adapt them to real-world circumstances.
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